In the post Independence Indian order of battle, the artillery was relegated to a third place in the combat order. While Indian gunners retained their traditional efficiency and contributed to the Indian success in our wars with Pakistan, shortage of artillery support and strict restrictions placed on ammunition expenditure were the prime reasons why we lost ground or failed to attain our planned objectives, (or suffered avoidable casualties), as this study of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war brings out. The readers may remark that the same Indian Army won a stunning victory in the liberation of Bangladesh. This book is able to bring home the imbalance in our combat structure to the policy makers of today and for them to take requisite steps to set it right. It is painful to comment that the planners of national defence, after India’s independence, failed to grasp the significance of gun, while structuring the combat composition of the Indian Army as this study of the 1971 Indo-Pak War, on the Western Front, so clearly reveals.